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COMMUNITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN FUNCTIONS OF RHETORIC
Gregory Clark
Brigham Young University
My purpose is to examine the function of rhetoric in an
ethical context.
I am defining rhetoric as communication
that addresses how the people who constitute a community
might best protect their common interests and meet their
common needs.
I am treating ethics as community-based, as
determined by the shared values of those people who are
connected by common needs and common interests.
My
examination is governed by an assumption that the communities
of which we are members hold as a primary value the right of
their members to contribute to the process of defining
collective beliefs and actions.
Rhetoric can function within
a community in such a way that it provides people with the
opportunity to do so by enabling them to participate in a
deliberative process, but it can also function in such a way
that it denies them that opportunity by preventing their
participation.
In other words, rhetoric can function within
our communities both, given our set of values, ethically and
unethically.
Whether a rhetorical discourse functions
ethically or unethically within a community depends, I
believe, less upon what the person presenting the discourse
intends than it does upon how those who hear or real the
discourse respond to the rhetoric.
Rhetoric describes communication which is brought into
existence in order to influence the beliefs and actions of a
community.
We have inherited a tradition of theory and
practice through which we understand rhetoric to be
assertions articulated for the purpose of directing a
community toward some kind of collective belief and,
ultima~ely, collective action. [1]
That tradition explores
how rhetoric functions as a means of mediating the various
and often conflicting perceptions and priorities of people
who must cooperate socially, economically, and legally--as a
means of solving problems which we might describe as
public. [2]
In doing so the tradition makes it clear that the
essential function of rhetorical communication is, in the
general sense of the word, political.
Because rhetoric is used by people to influence others in
matters of common concern, the ethicality of its use would
seem to be determined principally by the intent, or purpose,
of its user, the ~heto~.
In communities which value the full
and free political participation of their members, we assume
that the fundamental purpose of an ethical rhetor would be to
allow the hearers or readers of a discourse, the ~yg~nQ~, to
determine freely the extent to which that discourse will
influence their attitudes and actions. [3] The fundamental
purpose of an unethical rhetor within those communities, we
assume, would be to constrain that freedom.
Indeed, the ends
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of rhetoric as Cicero identified them--to instruct, to move,
to please--can be achieved by a rhetor with either purpose.
I am arguing, however, that the ~~~Q~~ for which rhetoric is
used does not necessarily determine its f~nQtion.
Certainly
the purpose of any discourse is controlled by the rhetor, but
whether that purpose becomes functional--whether it is
actually enacted by the community--remains within the control
of the audience. [4] Consequently, the purposes for which
rhetoric is used within a community are not as significant as
the functions rhetoric is allowed to have because the effects
of rhetoric, what it actually causes to occur, are determined
not by what a rhetor intends but by how an audience chooses
to respond.
I will explain my basis for this assertion by describing two
opposing functions of rhetoric--one that is essentially
authoritarian and the other essentially communitarian in
order to demonstrate that the status of each is determined
primarily by the response of the audience.
This will support
my thesis that whether discourse functions in a community to
support the free participation of its members in the
construction of collective knowledge and the deliberation of
collective action or to limit that participation depends less
upon the intent of rhetors within that community than it does
upon response of audiences to rhetoric.
This, I be.Lieve,
places the primary responsibility for the ethical function of
rhetoric with the audience, and thus with the community
itself.
The function of rhetoric is authoritarian when members of a
community enact, unexamined, the assertion of a rhetor.
The
process often begins with a rhetor who asserts a single
interpretation of proper collective belief and action in the
expectation that the audience will accept that interpretation
without fully judging it.
This expectation is founded upon
an assumption that the community is structured hierarchically
and within that hierarchy this rhetor is authorized to decide
this matter for others.
Rhetors with this assumption expect
their audiences to acknowledge that authority with immediate
assent.
When an audience does so, that audience accepts and
thus shares the rhetor's authoritarian assumption about the
structure of the community.
Consequently, while such
rhetoric is clearly authoritarian in its intent, or purpose,
it becomes authoritarian in actual function only when an
audience responds with passive assent.
If the authoritarian function of rhetoric depends not upon
what a rhetor intends but upon whether the audience enacts
that intention without independent judgment, then even
rhetoric that is not authoritarian in purpose can be made to
be authoritarian in function.
If an audience shares the
assumption of the authoritarian rhetor--that the rhetor is
authorized to judge for them--that audience perceives
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rhetoric as monologue, and will assent to the rhetor's
position without examining it regardless of its intent.
What
an audience does when it accepts this assumption is enact its
own political subordination to the rhetor within the
community they share.
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In direct opposition to the authoritarian function of
rhetoric is the communitarian function, a function brought
into existence when the members of a community who are the
audience actively examine, evaluate, and even revise the
interpretation of proper collective belief and action which
a rhetor has asserted.
Rhetoric is communitarian in purpose
when it is based upon the rhetor's expectation that the
audience, composed of people who share with the rhetor
responsibility for the well-being of the community, will
respond to what is asserted by examining, by evaluating, by
even asserting a revision in response.
That expectation is
based upon an assumption that the community is structured
without inherent hierarchy, that each member is authorized to
judge the interpretations of others in the process of
negotiating an agreement about what they will collectively
believe and what action they will collectively take.
If,
however, the rhetoric is to become communitarian in its
function, it must have an audience whose response will be
founded upon this equalitarian assumption about the structure
of the community.
Members of an audience who respond on this basis perceive
rhetoric functioning primarily as dialogue within the
community rather than monologue, perceiving themselves as
~ctive participants in the rhetorical--and political-process. [5]
Indeed, if the structure of a community is
equalitarian, the roles of rhetor and audience are
alternated: after asserting a position a rhetor must become
audience to enable some of those who had been audience to
become rhetors in response.
Consequently, when people act
upon this assumption about their place in the community and
their role in the rhetorical process within that community
they respond to rhetoric critically, with deliberated
judgment.
They respond in this way regardless of the intent
or purpose of the rhetoric they confront, thus preventing its
authoritarian function.
When they refuse to accept the
authoritarian assumption that subordinates audience to rhetor
in a rhetorical interaction, they enact their essential
political equality within the community by demanding by their
critical response that the process of defining collective
beliefs and actions be collaborative.
One of the earliest voices in the rhetorical tradition,
Plato, addressed these two opposing functions of rhetoric in
an ethical context.
In an early dialogue, the gorSi~§, Plato
condemned rhetoric as it was taught by the rhetoricians of
Athens.
For most of them rhetoric was, as George A. Kennedy
writes, a kind of magic a rhetor would work upon an audience
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to "stir the passions or obsess the mind and draw on the
listener to unconscious agreement with the speaker"
(Classical Rhetoric in !~~ ~hristi~Q ~Q~ Secular Traditi9Q
{Chapel Hill: UNe Press, 1980}, p. 30).
For them, rhetoric
was a method for manipulating an audience to accept and to
enact the will of a rhetor, thus empowering those who use
rhetoric well to impose their will upon others.
In his attack on this function of rhetoric, Plato compared
the methods available for maintaining the political body, a
community, to those available for maintaining a physical
body, identifying as "true arts" those which strengthen and
as "false arts" those which provide only an illusion of
strength.
First, Plato described gymnastics as a true art
for maintaining the physical body which, in return for active
exertion, provides strength, contrasting it with cosmetics, a
false art, which provides only an illusion of strength.
He
then identified the corresponding true and false political
arts: what he called jyggm~nt, through which members of a
community participate in the construction of solutions to
common problems; and ~h~~~i~, through which they are led to
accept solutions dictated to them while enjoying the illusion
of self-government.
At the heart of the distinction Plato made between the true
and false arts for maintaining a community is the l~vel of
participation allowed its members in the process: inherent in
the true art of politics is the active identification by
those who constitute the community of acceptable collective
beliefs and actions; and inherent in the false is the absence
of such activity.
In the ~Q~gi~§ Plato condemned rhetoric as
he had seen it function because it generally denied the
audience--the majority of the citizens of Athens--an
opportunity to judge matters that concerned them.
In a later
dialogue, however, Plato described rhetoric as he believed it
should function, enabling members of a community to judge and
respond to the assertions of rhetors and so contribute to the
construction of collective belief and action.
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In the fhA~~, Plato portrayed rhetoric functioning
dialectically as a process of collaborative inquiry
progressing toward a product of shared understanding.
It is,
essentially, rhetoric functioning as dialogue rather than
monologue.
Such rhetoric, as Stanley Fish describes it,
"does not preach the truth but asks that its [audience]
discover the truth for themselves," and Plato both described
and exemplified this function through the interaction of his
two characters, Socrates and Phaedrus (~~lf=£on~ming
~tifacts: ~ ~rience of Seventeenth-Century ~iterature
{Berkeley: UC Press, 1972}, pp. 1-2).
Phaedrus recites to Socrates a speech he has learned from the
rhetorician Lysias, a speech that gives Phaedrus pleasure,
but which he has not judged.
In response Socrates begins the
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process of teaching Phaedrus what Plato would teach us, that
accepting speeches unexamined allows us to risk accepting and
enacting ideas which are false, which violate what we value.
Socrates guides Phaedrus through the process of judging the
speech and examining the issues it raises and, in that
process, they begin to describe together a more ethical
function of rhetoric.
Although Socrates has a strong sense
what that ethical function might be, he does not impose it
upon Phaedrus.
Rather, he invites Phaedrus' judgment at each
stage of his presentation, allowing the understanding of
rhetoric which they come to share to emerge less from the
instruction given Phaedrus by Socrates than from their
collaborative examination of the answers each offers to the
questions posed by the other. [6]
A shared understanding of an ethical function of rhetoric.
although guided and even dominated by Socrates' assertions,
emerges through the process of their dialogue.
Socrates
asserts a position, inviting Phaedrus' judgment; Phaedrus
considers it and responds with statements and questions that
suggest a revision; Socrates then refines his position in
response to the understanding of Phaedrus and the progressing
content of their exchange.
When Socrates and Phaedrus
finally articulate their shared understanding of rhetoric. it
is a construction in which the prior judgment of Socrates.
although still prominent, has been improved upon ttrough its
confrontation with and resolution of the questions and
concerns of Phaedrus.
And because it was constructed in the
context of values they share as members of the same
community, their notion of rhetoric is. for them. ethical.
When Plato argued for a rhetoric based upon the principles of
dialectic, he was insisting upon the active participation of
audience in any rhetorical exchange.
Only such participation
can en~ure that rhetoric will have an ethical function, that
it will support the shared values of the people whose
concerns it addresses.
In Plato's rhetoric, one person might
lead the exchange, as Socrates did in the fhaedr~~. and one
position may even dominate the process, but those assertions
will not be accepted and enacted unexamined.
The audience
will judge them carefully, will question, will criticize, and
will assert revisions in response, thus making the rhetor an
audience.
Had Phaedrus not done so, had he responded to
Socrates' assertions without independent judgment. with
passive assent. rhetoric would have functioned in the
fhA~~~~ as the false art of delusion which Plato condemned.
If the audience is passive, accepting and enacting unexamined
what a rhetor asserts, the function of the rhetoric,
regardless of what the rhetor intends it to be. will be
authoritarian.
Plato's notion of an ethical rhetoric emphasizes response.
not assertion.
Assertions are the expressed perceptions of
one or of a few and thus they are inherently narrow.
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inherently incomplete.
They can be presented as if they are
whole. as if complete, for the purpose of imposing the
understanding of one or a few upon many, or they can be
offered to a community as heuristics that propel
collaborative deliberation and inquiry.
In either case.
assertions alone do not necessarily support community values.
They require the completion and validation that comes through
the critical response of an audience.
Only the judgment of
the collectivity can develop useful knowledge that supports
collective values and meets collective needs.
The practical implication of my argument is this: rhetoric
will function ethically in communities where audiences are
critical. where they participate in the dialogical process of
constructing collective belief and deciding collective
action.
Rhetors should inform their audiences that they
expect judgment. criticism. revisions of their assertions.
and encourage such responses by returning readily to the role
of audience.
But, more important, audiences must be careful
to neither fulfill the authoritarian purpose of a rhetor who
would dictate nor subvert the communitarian purpose of one
who would only suggest by accepting unexamined the assertions
of either.
The audience must examine all assertions, judge
them, and then respond.
The alternative is to abdicate the
right to self-government by empowering only those who can use
rhetoric well.
The ethical function of rhetoric iu any
community is, indeed, in the hands of the audience.
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NOTES
[1] Aristotle's three "genres" of rhetoric are defined
on the basis of the kind of public action each invites:
legal, legistative, or ceremonial.
Cicero's extended
discussion in g~ Q~atQ~~ develops at length the public nature
of rhetoric.
[2] S. Michael Halloran uses the term "public discourse"
to describe this traditional function of rhetorical
communication.
He discusses public discourse as the focus of
classical rhetoric in his article, "Rhetoric in the American
College Curriculum: The Decline of Public Discourse, "
fEELIEXI 3:3 (1982), 245-269. My interpretation of the
rhetorical tradition is built upon Halloran's work.
[3] The best modern interpreter of Aristotle's Rh~tQric,
which is the fundamental theoretical statement of the
function of rhetoric, argues that the purpose of public
discourse is not to change the mind of the audience, but to
present a reasonable position to which the audience might
choose to assent.
William M. A. Grimaldi writes: "The art,
or technique, of rhetoric is the ability to perceive and to
present evidence which makes decision ... possible; but to stop
with presentation" (StYQi~~ in t~ EhilQ~~~ Q! A~i~tQtl~~~
Bb§tg~iQ {Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1972}. p.
27) .
[4] I am indebted to William A. Wilson, whose comments
in response to an earlier paper focusing on the role and
responsibility of the rhetor led me to look again at the role
and the responsibility of audience.
[5] A series of studies published in the Qua~~~~l~
Qf ~~~Qh during the last fifteen years has examined
t~le dialogical nature of rhetorical communication.
The
seminal article is Richard L.
Johannesen's "The Emerging
Concept of Communication as Dialogue," (Dec 1971), 373-382.

JQy~nal

[6] This interpretation of the dialectical method is
elaborated by James L. Golden in "Plato Revisited: A Theory
of Discourse for All Seasons," ~~~~ Qn Classi~ Rheto~ig
and Modern U~QQ~~ (Carbondale: SIU Press, 1984), pp. 1636.

